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Delegation of Powers: A Historical and 
Functional Analysis 
Richard A. Epstein 
INTRODUCTION  
There is a spate of interest in the “nondelegation doctrine”—the 
prohibition against the delegation of legislative powers to the executive 
branch of government, or worse, to some independent agency. The 
immediate impetuses of the debate are the recent Supreme Court 
decisions in Gundy v. United States1 and Kisor v. Wilkie.2 Those cases 
have spurred the renewed interest in delegation—it seems that five 
members of the Supreme Court think that the time for reexamination is 
now.3 At this point, the mood is quite different from a generation ago, 
when Professor Cass Sunstein dismissed the Supreme Court’s 1935 
invocation of the nondelegation doctrine in both A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States4 and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan5 with this 
famous quip: “[I]t is more accurate, speaking purely descriptively, to see 
1935 as the real anomaly. We might say that the conventional doctrine 
has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”6 It is precisely 
because the good old days of judicial lassitude may be numbered that 
the nondelegation doctrine has received inordinate attention in recent 
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 1 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 2 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 3 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131. In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch was joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in dissent. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment 
solely to allow the issue to be decided in full when Justice Kavanaugh could contribute. 
Justice Kavanaugh has since opined that the Gorsuch dissent in Gundy “may warrant 
further consideration in future cases.” Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019). 
 4 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 5 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 6 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000). I 
criticize his position in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY OF MODERN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 67–73 (2020) [hereinafter DUBIOUS MORALITY]. 
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years from courts and scholars alike.7 Much of the discussion has 
centered on historical questions within a broad originalist framework. 
These analyses have led to conclusions that appear at first glance to be 
in deep tension with each other. 
The effort to revive the nondelegation doctrine has met fierce 
resistance on historical and originalist grounds. Most notable is the 
exhaustive historical account offered by Professors Julian Davis 
Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, who in their forthcoming article, 
Delegation at the Founding,8 take the position that looking for 
evidence of a nondelegation doctrine in the founding period is a bit 
like looking for a unicorn: lots of talk in theory but no presence in 
fact. In their view, “any particular use of coercive rulemaking 
authority could readily be characterized as the exercise of either 
executive or legislative power, and was thus formally valid 
regardless of the institution from which it issued.”9 In their view, it 
follows “[e]asily the best reading of the historical materials is that 
this question was simply left to politics.”10 It is to construct a 
firewall against such a movement that Mortenson and Bagley write 
in protest by reviewing the evidence in sufficient detail in order to 
beat the conservative originalists at their own game. Accordingly, 
they target Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy.11  
Gorsuch’s opinion [in Gundy] calls for ditching the intelligible principle 
standard in favor of a test that would distinguish between those statutes 
allowing the executive to “fill up the details” and those that confer 
policymaking discretion. Were it to become law, Gorsuch’s approach 
would force courts to make subjective and contestable judgments about 
what counts as a detail and what counts as something more.12  
Yet at no point do they explain why the “intelligible principle 
standard,” which they misconstrue,13 is free of similar ambiguities 
as the “fill-in-the-details” standard. Their selective appeal to 
linguistic relativism should be regarded as a tacit sign of 
intellectual surrender.14 Ironically, the principle of intelligibility has 
its own peculiar history that when properly understood is perfectly 
consistent with the fill-in-the-details standard they disparage. What 
is really at stake here, therefore, is not the choice of labels, but a 
 
 7 See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, 
and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164 (2019).  
 8 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 9 Id. (manuscript at 1). 
 10 Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 11 Id. (manuscript at 18–22). 
 12 Id. (manuscript at 20). 
 13 See discussion of Hampton infra p. 34. 
 14 Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the Decline of the Rule of Law, 39 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 583 (2016). 
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claim that only the lowest level of judicial scrutiny should be given 
to nondelegation challenges. Justice Gorsuch’s fill-in-the-details test 
is really a stand-in for a claim that a more robust form of scrutiny 
should be adopted in these cases. 
Nonetheless, their call has been taken up by other scholars 
on delegation in specific substantive areas. Thus, Cristine Kexel 
Chabot analyzes in great detail the delegations with respect to 
the public debt and concludes that both Hamilton and Madison 
blessed the actions of the First Congress that delegated the 
powers to “borrow Money” and “pay the Debts” conferred on 
Congress by Article I, Section 8.15 In a parallel development, 
Nicholas Parrillo explores a congressional delegation that 
occurred in 1798, which gave authority to the executive branch to 
obtain an inventory of real estate values throughout the United 
States.16 This project was necessary to implement the “direct 
taxation provision” found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 4: “No 
Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion 
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.”17 Executive branch officials were in charge of collecting, 
sorting, and evaluating the information, as has always been 
common in running surveys of this sort. 
Executive prerogative in this area dates to the Domesday 
book,18 which surveyed English titles under the supervision of the 
King, acting with his Council, long before the tripartite distinction 
between legislative, executive, and judicial was fully established.19 
 
 15 Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding, GA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 16 See Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against 
Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real 
Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 18 See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND: THREE ESSAYS 
IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1897). The effort, starting in 1085, to make a 
detailed study of the entire lands of England was done in large measure to find a taxation 
base. See id. at 1–3. As such, it involved the cooperation of “barons,” “legates,” and 
“justices.” Id. at 1. Justices were involved with the cooperative efforts because they were 
needed to resolve disputes over ownership. See id. at 11. 
 19 Neither Parliament nor any other legislative body had a role to play in this 
operation. It was an executive function issued by the King in Council, with a judicial 
backup. Here is one description:  
Then, at the midwinter [1085], was the king in Gloucester with his council . . . . 
After this had the king a large meeting, and very deep consultation with his 
council, about this land; how it was occupied, and by what sort of men. Then 
sent he his men over all England into each shire; commissioning them to find 
out ‘How many hundreds of hides were in the shire, what land the king himself 
had, and what stock upon the land; or, what dues he ought to have by the year 
from the shire.’ 
ALFRED THE GREAT, THE ANGLO-SAXON CHRONICLE 107 (James Henry Ingram trans., 
1996). 
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It is just not feasible for any deliberative body to engage in a survey 
of this kind, and the only question of delegation is how best to do 
this survey, which in this instance followed lines that are still in use 
today.20 Chabot and Parrillo, each separately, have undertaken 
their analyses with the same motivation that drove Mortenson and 
Bagley: to defend the current broad versions of the nondelegation 
doctrine from ungrounded attacks.21 In so doing, however, they 
have vastly overstated the potential consequences of reversing the 
outcome of Gundy by assuming that a reversal would entirely 
eviscerate the post-New Deal version of the nondelegation doctrine. 
In reality, it is both possible and correct to limit Gorsuch’s 
argument in Gundy to accommodate the progressive state (which in 
my view should be struck down on other constitutional grounds).22 
All these claims are subject to the obvious objection that the 
term “legislative power” must demarcate some area of exclusive 
legislative power, in contradistinction to both the “executive power” 
as used in Article II, and the judicial power, as used in Article III. 
Without doubt, there is much overlap in the work done among the 
political branches, and in many cases, it is far easier for an 
executive to discharge the task than Congress. After all, do we 
really expect Congress to make a survey of all lands in the United 
States? Or to renegotiate various kinds of debts, all of which require 
detailed knowledge of individual transactions, and none of which 
require the articulation of any major policy decision? But it hardly 
follows from these sensible divisions of labor between the Congress 
(which only met periodically during the Founding Era) and the 
Executive (who was, and is, always on call) that the overlap in 
functions between the two branches was complete. Nor does it 
follow that overturning some matters of delegation necessarily 
requires the invalidation of the entire administrative state.  
 
 20 As Richard FitzNeal wrote in the Dialogus de Scaccario:  
For as the sentence of that strict and terrible last account cannot be evaded by 
any skilful [sic] subterfuge, so when this book is appealed to . . . its sentence 
cannot be quashed or set aside with impunity. That is why we have called the 
book ‘the Book of Judgement’ . . . because its decisions, like those of the Last 
Judgement, are unalterable.  
RICHARD, SON OF NIGEL, THE COURSE OF THE EXCHEQUER 64 (V.H. Galbraith & R.A.B. 
Mynors eds., Charles Johnson trans., 1950). 
 21 “Even if the Court does not categorically invalidate all agency rulemaking about 
domestic private conduct other than fact-finding, rulemaking is so ubiquitous that mere 
doubt about its constitutionality could work major changes in the nondelegation doctrine 
and administrative law more generally.” Parrillo, supra note 16 (manuscript at 6). “The 
new Supreme Court is poised to bring the administrative state to a grinding halt. Five 
Justices have endorsed Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States—an opinion 
that threatens to invalidate countless regulatory statutes in which Congress has 
delegated significant policymaking authority to the executive branch.” Chabot, supra note 
15 (manuscript at 1). 
 22 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006). 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 9:19 AM 
2021] Delegation of Powers: A Historical and Functional Analysis 663 
Given the fever pitch of the nondelegation discussion, it is no 
surprise that Mortenson and Bagley’s article has prompted a 
vigorous response. In his detailed historical account of the same 
materials, Ilan Wurman defends a more exacting nondelegation 
position by arguing that the essential features of a given legal 
scheme must be passed by a legislature before the executive (or 
his delegate) is allowed to fill in the blanks.23  
Wurman is far closer to the truth, but for the moment, it 
should be sufficient to note at least one counterexample to the 
view that legislation and executive action are perfectly 
substitutable. It should be perfectly clear, as becomes evident in 
the pages below, that at no time could the executive unilaterally 
impose a pension system, create a patent system, organize a post 
road system, or conduct an inventory of real estate, without 
having first taken its cue from Congress. The reason we do not 
get a constant repetition of the same theme is that some version 
of a nondelegation norm is so central to the constitutional 
structure that no commentator thought fit to deny it in theory 
and no President sought to extend his power beyond the implicit 
line in the sand that was as apparent in the Founding period as 
it is today. 
Filling in the details about how this schema should work is 
no easy task. It is hardly evident that the operation of the 
delegation doctrine at the Founding should bear any close 
similarity with the nondelegation doctrine today when the major 
shifts in constitutional order of the progressive era—the 
expansion of federal commerce and taxing powers, as well as the 
contraction of constitutional protections for economic liberties 
and property rights—have led to the rise of a modern 
administrative state that may well involve a very different form 
of administrative law.24  
It is important here not to get ahead of oneself, for what is 
often missing in these elaborate historical debates is a sure sense 
of why anyone—legislators, judges, lawyers, laypersons, and even 
scholars—should care about the doctrine in the first place. This 
Article aims to fill the gap with a functional analysis of the 
nondelegation doctrine that helps explain where it should have 
teeth and where it should not. Accordingly, Part I offers a brief 
account of the evolution of the nondelegation doctrine from a 
historical—mostly originalist in nature—and doctrinal 
perspective. Part II develops a simple analytical model to explain 
 
 23 Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2021). 
 24 See DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 6. 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 9:19 AM 
664 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:3 
why and how the doctrine should be used, by resorting back to a 
traditional account of agency costs, which builds upon the classic 
1976 article on the subject by Meckling and Jensen, there 
restricted to the context of public corporations. Part III explains 
how this model works in the context of private business contexts, 
in order to set up a baseline against which the public law 
nondelegation doctrine, which operates in a different 
institutional setting, can be evaluated. In so doing, this Article 
looks both at bailment arrangements with chattels and trustee 
decisions over corporate assets to show the persistent net benefit 
from delegating to agents creates a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of delegation. But like any rebuttable presumption, it is 
necessary to state the conditions in which the presumption can 
be overcome. In this case, the presumption should be abandoned 
whenever there is evidence of a serious conflict of interest 
between the welfare of the principal, the public at large, and its 
agents, Congress, the President, and various administrative 
agencies. In Part IV, the Article circles back from the private 
sector to the public sector in order to apply this model to help 
explain a broad range of delegation cases, starting with the First 
Congress’s treatment of pensions, patents, and post roads, and 
then extending forward through the nineteenth century into the 
post-New Deal developments ending up with Gundy. 
In carrying out this four-part exercise, it is important to 
never lose sight of two inescapable difficulties in the articulation 
and application of any legal principle. The moment anyone on or 
off the courts starts to talk about rebuttable presumptions in any 
legal setting, it necessarily implicates trade-offs in the economic 
analysis. In the end, there is always some need to balance 
interests, which will inexorably lead to hard borderline cases 
whether the analysis is done on a class basis or a case-by-case 
basis. In close cases on which reasonable persons can disagree, 
the novel circumstances that give rise to cases are likely to 
result, metaphorically and literally, in five-to-four decisions in 
the Supreme Court.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
As is characteristic of many major legal principles, the 
nondelegation doctrine has its origins in Roman law. It began 
with a rigid general principle, delegatus non potest delegare—the 
delegatee is not able to delegate to a subdelegatee. Indeed, as will 
become clear, that maxim does not stand in splendid isolation, 
but rather operates as a special instance of broader principles of 
“natural justice” as it is termed in England, or “procedural due 
process” as it is termed in the United States. The basic principles 
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of natural justice are two: nemo judex in causa sua (“no one 
should be a judge in his own cause”) and audi alteram partem 
(“hear the other side”).25 The nondelegation maxim has the 
typical Roman law strengths and weaknesses. The former is its 
shrewd condensation of a principle with strong intuitive appeal 
that survives through the ages. Yet its characteristic weakness, 
true of much Roman law doctrine, is that it is overbroad in part 
because it does not offer an explicit rationale for its adoption. 
More concretely, in the Roman setting, most of these delegations 
were from single principals to a single agent. The principle does 
not explicitly address the rise of large corporate structures, 
which play a central role today and require extensive delegation 
to operate. In addition, the natural law theories with which the 
Romans and early Anglo-Americans worked did not offer a strong 
defense of their principles in the consequentialist terms that 
today rule the roost.26 
Yet that same conceptual weakness applies to the 
constitutional scholarship of today. One common feature of both 
originalism and living constitutionalism is that neither approach 
appeals to consequentialist theories to make sense out of the 
nondelegation doctrine, as is evident in the articles that reexamine 
the delegation doctrine. Indeed, the canonical texts that deal with 
this problem offer little assistance in this endeavor. Consider a 
famous passage from John Locke’s Second Treatise:  
The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other 
hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have 
it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of 
the common-wealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and 
appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, 
We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and 
in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; 
nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those 
whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The 
power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive 
voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive 
grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make 
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of 
making laws, and place it in other hands.27  
 
 25 See SIR WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 384, 405 
(11th ed. 2014). More specifically, “in administrative law natural justice is a well-defined 
concept which comprises two fundamental rules of fair procedure: that a man may not be 
a judge in his own cause; and that a man’s defence must always be fairly heard.” Id. at 
374. Wade and Forsyth make numerous references to the American cases and the parallel 
concept of procedural due process. 
 26 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713, 716 (1989). 
 27 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690). 
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Locke’s argument is sound as far as it goes, but, for a 
canonical text, it does not go very far. It is surely the case that 
if a group of legislators is selected by some legitimate process, it 
cannot simply wash its hands of its responsibilities, backed by 
individual oaths of office, by asking a second body to step in its 
shoes to do its legislative work. For these purposes, it does not 
matter how the legislature is selected: it applies to a Republican 
form of government that features indirect elections (including 
the selection of Senators by state legislatures), just as it applies 
to legislatures who operate by, as Madison feared, simple 
popular majorities. The basic risk is the same regardless of 
whether we call the action of the derivative actor an outright 
transfer of power or only its further delegation.28 Consistent 
with this view, there has long been a principle that the 
government cannot transfer its police power to a third party.29 
Nor indeed could any individual legislator decide to appoint a 
successor to his place and then resign from office. The new body 
will not come up with the same laws as the old body, given its 
different membership. Indeed, if by some miracle it did, 
everyone would think of this delegation as a form of harmless 
error. 
This same principle can be extended, as Wurman correctly 
argues, to a situation in which the original legislature reserves 
the power to call back its power at some future time. That 
option still leaves the interim actions with full force and effect, 
unless the reclamation of the power is somehow read to “void” 
those actions in ways that only complicate the reliance interest 
of citizens in the consistency and integrity of law, which Locke 
long prized.30 As was said by Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. 
Borden, it is dangerous business to bless any transfer of power 
(including overthrow) which calls into question the status of all 
interim actions.31 Locke only deals with the case of total 
 
 28 For the strong arguments in favor of this position, see Wurman, supra note 23 
(manuscript at 4–6) rejecting the position of Mortenson and Bagley that there was a 
categorical distinction between alienation and delegation. Wurman summarizes their 
position as follows: “[T]he Founders agreed that although the legislative branch could not 
alienate its power—it could not give away its power for good—the legislative branch could 
delegate its power, so long as it had the ultimate authority to reclaim any legislative 
power that it had so delegated.” Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 29 See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817–18 (1879). “All agree that the 
legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State,” such that the state could not 
make a long-term binding contract to give rights to lotteries. These contracts “are not, in 
the legal acceptation of the term, mala in se, but, as we have just seen, may properly be 
made mala prohibita. They are a species of gambling, and wrong in their influences. They 
disturb the checks and balances of a well-ordered community.” Id. at 821. 
 30 LOCKE, supra note 27, § 142. The same position is articulated in LON L. FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 31 See 48 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1849).  
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delegation, alienation, or transfer, but does not address the 
interim cases of partial delegation that were then everyday 
occurrences in England, given its complex system of public 
administration that befit a major power.32 For Locke’s purposes, 
it may well have been sufficient to block the major abuse, but 
for anyone who works within a detailed constitutional 
framework, the intermediate cases present the real challenge. It 
is here that the differences are indeed troublesome, for everyone 
on both sides of the debate admits that some delegation is 
necessary and some prohibited, differing only in the putative 
extent of the differences, without offering any theory as to how 
they should be resolved.  
The old maxim that a public office is a public trust deserves in 
these cases to be taken literally, and a private trustee cannot put 
someone else in his place unless and until there is some orderly 
process, usually set out in the trust instrument, for them to do 
so.33 But by the same token, the principle does not quite explain 
what the legislative power is, or whether a limited delegation 
should be regarded as a permissible delegation to the executive or 
an improper transfer of some portion of the legislative power. That 
line-drawing difficulty is reflected in the constitutional text. 
Article I deals with the legislative power but defines only specific 
grants of power in which the House and the Senate do not 
legislate. Specifically, Article I includes the Senate’s power to 
approve treaties and confirm principal officers, the House and 
Senate’s respective roles in impeachment, and the processes in 
making resolutions or proclamations.34 These specific powers 
survive any general categorization, and leave wide open the 
 
For, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as proposed by the 
plaintiff, and it should be decided that the charter government had no legal 
existence during the period of time above mentioned,—if it had been annulled 
by the adoption of the opposing government,—then the laws passed by its 
legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its 
salaries and compensation to its officers illegally paid; its public accounts 
improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of its courts in civil and 
criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions into 
operation answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals.  
Id. 
 32 See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 25, at 373–475.  
 33 See, e.g., S. DOC. NO. 93-1, at 115–16 (1973) (“The ideal concept of public office, 
expressed by the words, ‘A public office is a public trust’, signifies that the officer has been 
entrusted with public power by the people; that the officer holds this power in trust to be 
used only for their benefit and never for the benefit of himself or of a few; and that the 
officer must never conduct his own affairs so as to infringe on the public interest. All 
official conduct of Members of the Senate should be guided by this paramount concept of 
public office.”). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. I; see generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 318–29 (1936). 
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possibility that some delegations by the legislature properly hand 
things over to the President, or to the heads of his departments.35 
Getting the right answer in the extreme all-or-nothing case 
remains critical for the overall enterprise, but it does not tell when 
or why lesser forms of delegation should be regarded as 
permissible actions or an impermissible surrender of legislative 
power. 
These principles, and these risks, were well understood in 
the founding period. Thus, the public trust language was in 
common use at the time. Elsewhere in the Second Treatise, Locke 
wrote of the legislative power “to which all the rest are and must 
be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to 
act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme 
power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the 
legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.”36 With a 
heavy reliance on Locke, Robert Natelson identified the following 
six standard fiduciary duties: (1) follow instructions and remain 
within authority, (2) loyalty and good faith, (3) care, (4) exercise 
personal discretion, (5) account, and (6) impartiality.37 It takes 
little imagination to see that the duty to exercise personal 
discretion operates as a limit on the power of delegation. But the 
statement of that principle, however powerful, does not tell how 
far it goes. Madison himself was always of two minds on the 
subject. In the one breath, in anticipation of Wayman, he could 
state with confidence that the trichotomy of the legislature that 
makes the law, the executive who enforces it, and the judiciary 
that construes the law is a fundamental bulwark of liberty: “The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, 
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny.”38 But he also knew that the lines 
could not be precisely drawn, and was prepared to lie with the 
consequences. Thus, in his defense of the 1800 Virginia 
resolutions, he wrote: 
 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 36 LOCKE, supra note 27, § 149. 
 37 Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE 
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 57–59 (Gary Lawson et al. eds., 2010). 
Elsewhere, Natelson has written, “I have not been able to find a single public 
pronouncement in the constitutional debate contending or implying that the comparison 
of government officials and private fiduciaries was inapt. The fiduciary metaphor seems 
to rank just below ‘liberty’ and ‘republicanism’ as an element of the ideology of the day.” 
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1086 
(2004). 
 38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2011). 
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However difficult it may be to mark, in every case, with clearness and 
certainty, the line which divides legislative power, from the other 
departments of power; all will agree, that the powers referred to these 
departments may be so general and undefined, as to be of a 
legislative, not of an executive or judicial nature; and may for that 
reason be unconstitutional. Details, to a certain degree, are essential 
to the nature and character of a law . . . . 39 
That position made its way into the case law through a well-known 
passage from Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard.40 He 
addresses the nondelegation principle in connection with deciding 
whether the federal courts are entitled to make rules of procedure for all 
actions, state or federal, brought in federal court. He starts by stressing 
what he regards as an obvious proposition: “It will not be contended that 
Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers 
which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”41 But there are certain 
issues that are subject to control by either Congress or the Executive, or 
by the Executive or the Judiciary—including setting the rules of the 
return of writs and other processes. The Chief Justice then must draw 
the line between the exclusive and nonexclusive cases that Mortenson 
and Bagley deny exist, and he does so in this much-mooted passage that 
echoes Madison’s views: 
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the 
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes 
the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the 
discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this 
power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court 
will not enter unnecessarily.42 
Marshall thus establishes a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of the delegations Congress can make to the two other branches 
of government, while accepting as binding the tripartite division 
of powers set out in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. The 
terms that Marshall uses to organize cases in that overlapping 
domain are as good as one can get in dealing with terms that fall 
into a continuum. Indeed, precisely this logic is evident in the 
1934 federal statute that delegated to the Supreme Court 
superintendence over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
key provision reads: 
Be it enacted . . . That the Supreme Court of the United States shall 
have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of 
 
 39 James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 303, 
324 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991); Wurman, supra note 23, at 20, discussed in 
connection with the Aliens Friends Act. 
 40 23 U.S. 1 (1825). 
 41 Id. at 42. 
 42 Id. at 46. 
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the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the 
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and 
procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, 
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.43 
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,44 the Supreme Court cited 
Wayman to support this proposition, while paying full attention 
to the proviso found in the last sentence quoted above: 
Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure 
of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or 
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the 
statutes or Constitution of the United States; but it has never essayed 
to declare the substantive state law, or to abolish or nullify a right 
recognized by the substantive law of the state where the cause of 
action arose, save where a right or duty is imposed in a field 
committed to Congress by the Constitution.45 
The clear inference from these two delegation cases is that 
some general nondelegation doctrine was operative as an 
indisputable background norm. In the end, a categorical 
distinction between branches of government necessarily gives 
rise to some difficult cases of degree in the middle. But so long as 
the basic principle is observed, the system will survive the 
numerous marginal cases, at least if we can develop some 
analytical framework to resolve these problems. 
II. THE ANALYTICAL TRADEOFF 
The ups and downs in the historical debates over the 
nondelegation doctrine should come as no surprise, but they are 
just a reflection of the larger debate over the role of agents in all 
kinds of business and social transactions. The Roman maxim qui 
facit per alium facit pro se (“he who transacts through another 
transacts for himself”) applies across the board for the simple 
reason that it is typically not possible for any individual to 
spread himself so thin that he can manage everything he needs 
managed without cooperation from others. In general, the basic 
principle of contractual choice is that voluntary agreements are 
for mutual benefits, and that principle applies as much to the 
agency relationship as it does to ordinary contracts of hire and 
sale. By extension, the decision to use an agent, and thus to 
delegate power, should be understood as part of the basic logic of 
the division of labor. Thus, when specific tasks are divided in 
routine transactions, the allocation of rights and responsibilities 
 
 43 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
 44 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941). 
 45 Id. (citing Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42). 
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is almost never an all-or-nothing affair. There is a bilateral risk. 
The principal may fear that the agent will stray too far from the 
appointed task, including running away with either goods or 
money. The agent fears that the principal may not pay for the 
work done, or may give garbled instructions that make the 
effective discharge of the task impossible. So, in virtually every 
situation, some restrictions monitored in a wide variety of ways 
are placed on the agent’s discretion. Knowing what these 
restrictions look like and why they are imposed gives a sense of 
direction to private law transactions that can be used to evaluate 
the public law transactions that inspired some version of the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
To gain this sense of direction, we have to start with a simple 
model of comparative advantage: what is it that the principal can 
do better than the agent, and what can the agent do better than 
the principal? The principal, if an individual, in general will have 
a strong sense of his or her own preferences, and an ideal agency 
relationship is one that makes sure that the contractual decisions 
made by the agent are the perfect reflection and implementation 
of the preferences of the principal. In a situation of perfect trust 
and perfect knowledge, the delegation problem literally takes 
care of itself. The principal gives the signal and the agent springs 
into action, and all proceeds in accordance with the plan when 
monitoring costs are zero for both sides. This is closely related to 
the principle that no protection against government takings with 
a just compensation remedy is ever necessary in a world in which 
the risks of ignorance and fraud are put to one side.46 It is better 
for both sides to save the transaction costs needed to set just 
compensation when the risk of misbehavior by government is 
zero. 
But the perfect correlation of knowledge and preferences is 
yet another illustration of why, for lawyers and economists, 
Coase’s “zero transaction costs” world is the closest that we get to 
heaven.47 In reality, there is always some slippage on either 
knowledge or motivation, and the potential of some conflict of 
interest requires imposing limitations on the power of the agent. 
For example, the regulations of habitat protection under the 
Endangered Species Act48 go far beyond the original intention of 
the statute, which contemplated that the government would have 
to pay to secure the habitat from private owners. Yet in Babbitt 
 
 46 See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 41, 52 (1992). 
 47 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
  48 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531. 
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v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,49 the 
principles of administrative deference sustained such regulations 
(championed by environmentalists), even though they cut far 
deeper than the original statutory design allowed.50 Clearly the 
political balance inside the Department of Interior was different 
from that inside the Congress that passed the statute, and a 
healthy dose of Chevron deference let the Supreme Court easily 
ratify that conscious agency drift.51 Similarly, the gender 
discrimination rules under Title IX, when applied to 
intercollegiate athletics, converted a general antidiscrimination 
statute into a rigid quota statute, and this too was done by an 
agency determination. The scope of this agency determination 
was then further extended by an agency letter that has remained 
in effect for over forty years.52 
The agency costs associated with this form of delegation in 
these political contexts are far more comprehensive than those that 
are involved in the famous, but stripped-down, agency cost model of 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling,53 because they cannot be 
analyzed exclusively within a simple profit-maximization model. 
Jensen and Meckling were well aware of the generality of the 
problem, but to make their foray tractable they confine their work 
to “the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual 
arrangements between the owners and top management of the 
corporation.”54 
 
 49 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995). 
 50 Id. For criticism, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 S. CT. ECON. REV. 
1 (1996). 
 51 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 703, 708. 
 52 The operative provision of Title IX reads: “No person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The exhaustive regulations under this 
section relating to Title IX are found in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2020) and Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 239 (Dec. 11, 1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R pt. 
26), which pushes the envelope even further. For my criticism, see Richard A. Epstein, 
Foreword: “Just Do It!” Title IX as a Threat to University Autonomy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1365 (2003). 
 53 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). Jensen 
and Meckling provide the following definition for an agency relationship: “[A] contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent.” Id. Note that their definition speaks of “delegating some [not all] 
decision making authority to the agent.” Id. And further, they “define agency costs as the 
sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by 
the agent, (3) the residual loss.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 54 Id. at 309. 
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Nonetheless, that model can be usefully extended to address 
the nondelegation problem in constitutional law. The more 
general formulation of the problem has the delegator (the 
legislature to whom all powers in Article I of the Constitution are 
granted) acting at Time I in setting priorities that have to be 
executed at Time II by its agent (the President, or his agent) that 
could be then handed off to some sub-delegate. The principal has 
better collective knowledge of the priorities to be embodied in the 
general problem, but down the road the agent will have better 
information about the costs and benefits of various strategies 
that are not available to the principal. The problem need not stop 
at three levels, for in complex organizations, multiple levels of 
delegation should be regarded as the rule, not the exception. 
Accordingly, even in the best of situations, we should expect to 
see the emergence of a mixed strategy in which some ex ante 
explicit limitations are placed by any principal on its agent, but 
some degree of deference is left to the action down below. 
Consistent with the Jensen and Meckling model, we expect 
to observe trade-offs at the margin. Too little oversight allows an 
agent to go astray, and too much oversight could create costly 
paralysis or delay.55 The exact point of trade-off will depend on 
the alignment at each level of the interest of principal and agent. 
This is why it is commonly the case that general partners (often 
family relations) allow for the broad delegation of authorities, 
because a generalized duty of good faith—defined here as one in 
which each party takes the interests of his partner as equal to his 
own—is likely to occur in these settings where the biological 
connection operates as a nonlegal but powerful constraint.56 
Hence, as the trust relationship increases, the level of monitoring 
is reduced, which gives the small family firm an advantage over 
firms of comparable size that do not share the same degree of 
genetic and social overlap. Yet by the same token, the use of 
family ties necessarily limits the size of the firm, so that more 
formal restraints have to be imposed when the size of the firm 
 
  55 Id.  
 56 The biological notion is one of inclusive fitness, whereby the parties share some 
but not all common genes. For the leading paper on this topic, see W.D. Hamilton, The 
Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour, 7 J. THEORETICAL. BIOLOGY 1, 1–2 (1964) 
(developing the identical framework as Jensen and Meckling to describe biological 
overlaps between relatives). In the simple agency cost example, a parent shared fifty 
percent of the genes with a child. Hence, it will take any action that costs it one unit to 
itself so long as it generates two units of benefit for the offspring. That relationship is 
easily satisfied with newborns and young children. But parent-child conflicts emerge on 
both sides as both parents and children age. The ratio remains the same, but the 
conditions for its satisfaction differ. See Robert L. Trivers, Parent-Offspring Conflict, 14 
AM. ZOOLOGIST 249, 250 (1974). 
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must expand in order to meet the demands of a larger market. 
Billions of credit or debit card transactions cannot be 
individuated to take into account the peculiar preferences of all 
individuals. There must be, and is, a standard protocol that is 
easy to apply, done with a high level of certitude that binds all 
participants to the letter of the standard contract, with no room 
for individuation of transaction or institutional discretion in 
execution. 
III. PRIVATE LAW APPLICATIONS  
It should be evident both with public corporations and with 
political governance that the slippage is far greater, such that the 
level of social control has to be more intense.57 Therefore, it is 
important to understand how this mini drama plays out in 
connection with sub-delegation in a variety of settings. Thus, in a 
simple family example with no institutional overtones, a parent 
allows his son to drive his car. But usually there is an explicit 
prohibition against the son allowing his friends to drive the car 
as well. The father made the initial delegation because he had 
confidence in his son, but he has no knowledge or control over 
any his son’s friends or acquaintances should the car be further 
handed over, i.e., by way of a sub-bailment. So, if the restriction 
is put on, the understanding is that it will be followed. There 
may be some exceptions for cases of genuine necessity, but the 
amount of discretion will be proportionately reduced when it is 
possible for the son to speak with the parent before making the 
sub-delegation. In essence, the knowledge of the principal is 
brought forward to reduce the conflicts in question. Moreover, in 
some cases, there may be no explicit instruction one way or 
another about whether the delegation should be allowed, at 
which point the parties face the same question of implied 
limitations on conduct for both agent and principal that arise 
everywhere in the law. The ever-present knowledge of potential 
 
 57 These bona fide contracts date back to Roman law and apply in cases in which 
there is need for flexibility, as in a partnership, where duties are defined in terms of good 
faith. See G. INST. 3.137 (“Likewise, in contracts of this description the parties are 
reciprocally liable, because each is liable to the other to perform what is proper and just; 
while, on the other hand, in the case of verbal obligations one party stipulates and the 
other promises; and in the entry of claims one party creates an obligation by doing so, and 
the other becomes liable.”). Note the opposition between the good faith contracts (sale, 
hire, agency, and partnership) and the stipulation, a formal unilateral contract whereby 
one person promises to pay a particular sum of money or to hand over a particular thing. 
Usually there is discretion in the former and none in the latter, but the distinction is 
never absolute. Adjustments are expected as a matter of course in the consensual good 
faith contracts, but with liquidated obligations, the exceptions are narrow and must be 
specially pleaded. The same basic framework applies today to various types of commercial 
arrangements. 
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conflicts of interest is probably strong enough in most contexts to 
impose on the bailee an obligation not to allow other persons to 
drive the car unless permission can be explicitly obtained from 
above or unless narrow conditions of necessity pertain.  
Speaking generally, the scope of the limitations likely 
increases when there are multiple principals (e.g., co-owners of 
the car). Where the number of co-owners is small, informal 
adjustments usually work to reach a solution. But when the 
number of co-owners is large, the prospect of disagreement is 
great so that collective decisions cannot be made in the first 
instance. It is this transactional situation that explains why the 
separation of ownership and control in the corporate context is a 
necessity, and it explains why that division gives rise to more 
stringent limitations on the actions of the board of directors.58 
Along with the limitations on sub-delegation, there are also 
limitations that deal with substantive terms: how long does the 
delegation last; what are the maximum and minimum prices that 
can be set; what other collateral conditions should be imposed as 
well. It is in all cases important to see how explicit delegations 
operate to form the framework for implicit limitations. 
These arguments, moreover, make it clear from the corporate 
context that there are no watertight separations between the 
matters that are left to a board of directors and matters that may 
be properly delegated to the CEO, who in turn can delegate these 
decisions downward. But the common thread that runs through 
all these cases is whether the delegation is so loose that it raises 
risks of deviation from the master plan. From this simple 
observation comes the central distinction in corporate law that 
delegations to agents who have conflicts of interests with the 
corporation are subject to higher scrutiny, under the so-called 
fair value rule, than delegations in which there are no such 
conflicts of interest—where a lower, somewhat indefinite 
business judgment rule insulates agents from liability for simple 
mistakes.59 The simple point is that, just as we should not expect 
perfect precision on these matters in the private sector, so we 
should not, as becomes clear, expect it in the public sector. But 
 
 58 For the seminal work, see generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 59 For a general discussion, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–108 (1991). Note that their exposition 
equivocates, as do other sources, on the precise scope of the business judgment rule. 
Simple negligence will not trigger the obligation, but the plus factors (e.g., knowledge or 
gross neglect) are notoriously difficult to pin down—a problem that carries over to sub-
delegation issues, which are not discussed there. I examine some of these issues in 
Richard A. Epstein, Inside the Coasean Firm: Why Variations in Competence and Taste 
Matter, 54 J.L. & ECON. S41 (2011) (dealing with a variety of agency relationships). 
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the common theme that broad delegations are routinely subject 
to restraints over critical matters of time, place, and manner that 
narrower ones may escape runs through both areas and helps in 
the public law to give some sense as to how the various cases 
should be decided. 
The public corporation occupies, however, an intermediate 
position between the small group and large government entities 
at all levels. The question then arises as to what the various 
forms of private structures (corporations, condominiums, and 
unions) tell us about the larger problem.60 There are two key 
features in the private context that have to be kept in mind in 
making any transition from a private to a public entity.61 These 
two features of private organizations tend to reduce the 
differences in preferences among joint investors in a corporation 
or in a large limited partnership.62 The first is that all of these 
people came together voluntarily in a common venture.63 
Accordingly, powerful selection pressures are at work both on 
formation and on subsequent transfers, so that the heterogeneity 
among its members will be reduced, thereby easing the costs of 
collective deliberation.64 Few people voluntarily enter into an 
organization where they expect to have deep philosophical 
divisions with the dominant faction.65 Then, second, even when 
these differences do emerge, as they will with time, the 
individuals involved have the ability to alienate shares or 
partnership interests to others who know the terms and 
conditions in the original charter.66 The outliers leave and the 
others join in, given an effective way to narrow the gap in 
preferences. The dissidents sell out to others whose own 
preferences are aligned with the group. Or, in the alternative, 
there can be a takeover bid by an outsider which then cashes out 
the original members who can go their own separate ways.67 
The situation with public bodies is very different. 
Membership in the group is not obtained by agreement, but by 
citizenship that comes as of birthright or by admission through 
 
 60 For my earlier treatment of this issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Redistribution 
Within Collective Organizations: What Corporations, Condominiums and Unions Tell Us 
About the Proper Use of Government Power, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 280 (2014). 
  61 See id. at 281. 
  62 See id. at 284. 
  63 See id. 
  64 See id. 
  65 See id. at 285. 
  66 See id. 
 67 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 113 (1965) (noting that the takeover is often a one-shot way to eliminate 
conflicts of interest among existing shareholders).  
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naturalization. The number of citizens (the rough functional 
equivalent to shareholders or partners) is likely to be very large, 
which on familiar transaction costs grounds generates huge 
impulses toward representative government. But the sentiments 
within these populations can be widely diverse. Yet at the same 
time there is no simple sale mechanism that can reduce the 
variance among members. And there is nothing remotely 
equivalent to the takeover mechanism. Since these large groups 
of individuals may have diverse sentiments, the practice of 
delegation could easily shift the center of gravity in the smaller 
group from what it is in the larger. There must accordingly be 
mechanisms that can control these risks, and a limitation on 
delegation is one such devise. These pressures, moreover, are 
likely to become more insistent as the size of government gets 
larger, so that in principle a nondelegation doctrine should be 
part of the toolkit to deal with the risks of deviation from 
collective sentiment. How this plays out is dependent on the size 
of government and the kinds of powers that it exercises. What 
follows is an effort to trace that development historically.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES OVER THE NONDELEGATION 
DOCTRINE 
It should be no surprise that the principles that yield no 
clear answer in all situations will give rise to spirited debate 
when their application is disputed. The set of relevant cases 
starts with the Founding period, indeed the first Congress, and 
works its way forward. Here is a quick tour, which shows no 
evidence of any serious challenge to the nondelegation doctrine 
during the pre-New Deal era. Quite simply, given the model 
above, all of these cases should resist a nondelegation challenge, 
even if we treat the legal constraint, as we should, as posing 
serious limitations on the powers of Congress. Put another way, 
the below cases—none of which invalidated a delegation as 
unconstitutional—were rightly decided. 
A. Disabled Veterans.  
The Confederation Congress authorized by statute a 
payment of pension to disabled veterans who fought in the 
Revolutionary War.68 It soon came time for the first Congress to 
implement that mandate, which in full reads as follows: 
 
 
 68 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 88) (providing a helpful 
summary). 
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An ACT providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the 
United States. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives, of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That the Military Pensions which have been granted and 
paid by the states respectively, in pursuance of the Acts of the United 
States in Congress assembled, to the Invalids who were wounded and 
disabled during the late war, shall be continued and paid by the 
United States from the fourth day of March last, for the space of one 
year, under such regulations as the President of the United States 
may direct.69  
The question in this case was whether the delegation in 
question, under which the President and Secretary Knox 
subsequently required that the payments be made in two equal 
installments and requiring affidavits as evidence of injury and 
entitlement to payment, was constitutional.70 In dealing with this 
statute, Professor Wurman is right to point out that Congress 
had by indirection fixed the amount of money to be paid and the 
period of time over which it was to be paid, so all that was left 
were matters of implementation.71 In effect, the 1789 legislation 
adopts a mixed strategy wherein the job of Congress was to 
“continue” payments authorized previously by the Confederation 
government, so that the action is one for the assumption of debts 
for work done by the pensioners in the federal service. At this 
point, the only thing left for the President to do was to ask for 
proof of disability and fix an amount. Given the constraints 
otherwise in place, this delegation made sense. There is little 
reason to think that Congress has better knowledge on questions 
of implementation or that the Presidential delegation indicated 
any skew in favor of one class of veterans over another. The case 
looks like one of a faithful agent—this makes the delegation 
proper. 
The overall situation would have been very different if the Act 
had not provided directly, or by reference, for the allocation, such 
that the President would have had power to determine the total 
budget and the individual payments. 72 At which point, the 
nondelegation doctrine should have been called into play given the 
explicit constitutional provision that all appropriations bills begin in 
the House of the Representatives.73 And it would have been a 
 
 69 An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, 
ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (1789). 
 70 See Wurman, supra note 23 (manuscript at 45–46) (outlining this 
implementation). 
 71 Id. 
 72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives . . . .”). 
  73 See id. 
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different manner if the President had decided to extend the period 
for payment or to include veterans from the French and Indian 
wars. Accordingly, this analysis also calls into question Mortenson 
and Bagley’s support for “a non-exclusivity thesis,” if that is taken 
to assume that the entire matter could be solved either by the 
Congress or the President so that the nondelegation doctrine just 
disappeared, given that budget constraint.74 
This pension does raise the larger question of what sorts of 
delegation should be made to the administrative agencies. In 
dealing with this topic, Professor Aditya Bamzai notes the 
extensive nineteenth century practice under which it was 
commonplace to delegate to executive branch officials the power 
to determine the amounts owed in connection with civil and 
military salaries, pensions, promotions, fines, and discharges for 
government employees; the terms and conditions of patent and 
land grants, including railroad rebates.75 He writes: “Under the 
traditional interpretive approach, American courts ‘respected’ 
longstanding and contemporaneous executive interpretations of 
law as part of a practice of deferring to longstanding and 
contemporaneous interpretation generally.”76 This line of cases 
was relied on by Justice John Paul Stevens to establish the 
general proposition that delegation to administrative agencies 
under standards of deference long preceded his decision in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.77  
The Stevens position, however, is not consistent with the 
basic framework developed here. The continuous application of a 
body of rules to a large number of small disputes allows an 
administrative agency to develop a workable standard via a 
course of dealing (as that term is used in commercial 
transactions)78 that both advances uniformity and gravitates, as 
is the case with most customs that arise through informed trial 
and error in consensual arrangements, toward an efficient 
solution.79 By so doing, the optimal conditions for delegation set 
 
  74 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7). 
  75 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 
YALE L.J. 908, 916 (2017). 
 76 Id. 
 77 467 U.S. 837, 844 n.14 (1984) (citing Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 206 
(1827)) (priority to rival land grants); Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568 (1884) (naval 
retirement benefits); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 (1877) (surgeon pay increase); 
United States v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 142 U.S. 615 (1892) (railroad rebates). For an 
extensive discussion of these cases, see Richard A. Epstein, Structural Protections for 
Individual Rights: The Indispensable Role of Article III—or Even Article I—Courts in the 
Administrative State, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 777, 792–99 (2019).  
 78 See U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).  
 79 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and 
History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992). 
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out above are satisfied. The field is one in which Congress is 
likely to be unable to deal with subtle differences in individual 
cases that arise over years, let alone decades. The agency 
expertise is able to achieve that result, and in general does so in 
an area that is not charged heavily with political differences, so 
that, presumptively, officials in the executive branch will act as 
faithful agents of the legislature. Accordingly, the deference that 
is accorded is to the line of authorities, and not to an individual 
instance that breaks from the accepted practice: 
It is a settled doctrine of this court that in case of ambiguity the 
judicial department will lean in favor of a construction given to a 
statute by the department charged with the execution of such statute, 
and, if such construction be acted upon for a number of years, will look 
with disfavor upon any sudden change, whereby parties who have 
contracted with the government upon the faith of such construction 
may be prejudiced.80  
Properly understood, this proposition is the polar opposite of 
the much-mooted Chevron deference. First, the issue raised in 
that case, about what counts as a “stationary source,”81 is not one 
that is resolved by looking at a pattern of past practices in small 
cases. Rather, Chevron makes this critical error that has set the 
law into a state of intellectual disarray. Second, the deference 
here is not to a line of cases, but to the last agency decision even 
if that decision diverts (often without special explanation) from 
an established line of cases.82 Hence, the rapid deviation from 
settled practice does indicate some deviation from the anticipated 
norm, so that when applying Chevron deference to decisions in 
the modern administrative state, one should be careful of these 
broad delegations. At this point, the need to constrain discretion 
points to the use of de novo review on questions of law, which is 
itself the textual norm under Section 706(a) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, in part to avoid invalidation on 
what should be a revived nondelegation doctrine.83 
B. The Patent Act of 1790.  
Yet another critical statute passed by the first Congress was 
the Patent Act of 1790, which also contained a mix of a legal 
 
 80 Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 142 U.S. at 621. 
  81 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
 82 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 990 
(2005). For a longer treatment of this issue, see DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 6, at 97–98. 
 83 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an 
agency action.”).  
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standard coupled with a delegation of its application. Its key 
provision for this point reads:  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the 
petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General of the 
United States, setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have 
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, 
or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and 
praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be 
lawful to and for the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the 
department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if 
they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and 
important, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the 
United States . . .84  
This statute clearly contains an explicit delegation to three 
cabinet members, which has to be valid under any system of law, for 
it manifestly cannot be the case that the Congress has the degree of 
expertise to collectively decide on whether a given patent 
application meets a standard that is remarkably similar in 
language and purpose to the one which exists today.85 The 
administrative decisions in individual cases to grant or deny are by 
no stretch of the imagination legislative acts. Mortenson and Bagley 
claim that this system represents some vast delegation of 
administrative power whereby “[t]he executive branch was thus 
empowered to prescribe, recognize, and adjust the private rights of 
both inventors and putative infringers—in other words, just the 
kind of ‘blank check to write a code of conduct governing private 
conduct’ that Justice Gorsuch decried in Gundy.”86 Not so. The 
entire operation of the Patent Act of 1790 did not reflect the mores 
of the modern administrative state.87 Indeed, as Adam Mossoff 
notes, the Act of 1790 was a conscious effort to break from the 
English system, which tolerated such discretion, to its vast 
disadvantage88: 
It is the core difference between defining a patent, on the one hand, as 
a private property right or, on the other hand, as a regulatory 
entitlement—between securing rights through private law doctrines 
and legal institutions constrained by the rule of law versus granting 
 
 84 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109. 
 85 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”). 
 86 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 84). 
 87 See Adam Mossoff, Institutional Design in Patent Law: Private Property Rights or 
Regulatory Entitlements, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 921–23 (2019). 
  88 See id. at 921–22.  
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rights as matters of public policy and through discretionary decision-
making processes in the political organs of the government.89  
Indeed, the constant reference to the term “grant” in the Act 
of 1790 is strong evidence that they conceived of these patent 
rights as vested once created, and thus, protected as a form of 
property against government expropriation, which in turn led to 
a restricted view of government.90 Thus, John Duffy made 
explicit the contrast between the pre- and post-New Deal view of 
patent rights: “Unlike the sweeping delegations conferred in the 
Progressive and New Deal eras, the delegations of governmental 
power for the patent system were, and still are [as of 2000], 
extraordinarily narrow.”91 
Given this institutional framework, it is not surprising that 
the downward delegation to the committee of three met both of 
the tests for a sensible delegation set out above: There was 
greater knowledge down below on particular cases and no 
obvious sign of institutional bias. Today, it may seem ludicrous 
that three of the first four cabinet members—the Postmaster 
General was not included—should be pressed into this service. 
Indeed, as the pace of business increased, a separate patent (and 
trade) office was developed to deal with the overall issue, again 
without serious challenges to the delegation. But there is no 
evidence that this particular delegation led to any deviation from 
the proposed statutory standard, and the decision in the 
executive branch allows for an individualized update based on 
knowledge that was obtained after the statute was enacted. 
There is, of course, some looseness in the language, but that 
hardly condemns this statute on the grounds of vagueness, for 
over 200 years of constant tinkering has not yielded a general 
formulation that radically departs from the 1790 standard.  
Mortenson and Bagley miss all of the institutional 
constraints operative in the field when they describe this 
delegation of authority to the executive branch as a “blank check” 
to write an entire patent code.92 There is no doubt that these 
decisions necessarily require some determination as to whether 
the new device represents a sufficient advance over previous 
 
 89 Id. at 922. 
 90 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Patent Originalism, CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
 91 John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian 
Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1133 (2000); see 
also B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 51 (2005) (explaining that in contrast 
to British patent law, “U.S. doctrines emphatically repudiated the notion that the rights 
of patentees were subject to the arbitrary dictates of government”). 
  92 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 84). 
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devices to count as a “nonobvious” advance worthy of protection.93 
But even though these judgments are required to make good the 
statutory scheme, it would be wrong to say that the Patent and 
Trademark Office could do whatever it wanted. It could not, for 
example, decide to issue patents while ignoring some of the 
requirements set out in the statute; nor could it decide to deny 
patents by insisting on some non-statutory element of its own, 
even though the application meets all the other standards. That 
principle has some traction in modern administrative law, in cases 
such as Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, where Justice Rehnquist in the sharpest of terms 
took the view that the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia 
was out of line when it tried to slow down the construction of 
nuclear power plants (which it eventually did anyhow) by adding 
new requirements to those set out in the Administrative Procedure 
Act.94 The limits on delegation are also evident in the simple 
proposition that the Patent and Trademark Office most certainly 
could not decide to adopt some “first-to-file” approach, writ large,95 
which would, unless suitably cabined, allow non-inventors to claim 
patent rights. Indeed, when the “first-inventor-to-file” rule was 
adopted in 2011, it was through an explicit provision of the 
America Invents Act and not by any pronouncement of the Patent 
and Trademark Office.96 Furthermore, individual decisions are 
also subject to judicial review, which could not take place sensibly 
if the entire process were as ill-formed as Mortenson and Bagley 
suggest. In fact, the general patent law does not operate through 
government regulations but relies on judicial decisions to fill in the 
gaps, which works the same way no matter who decides the 
various questions raised in patent enforcement. And, of course, 
neither the President nor any of his subordinates could decide to 
introduce any patent system at all if Congress had not exercised 
the grant of power given to it under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.97 
 
 93 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, 
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in 
section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such 
that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the 
claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the 
invention was made.”). 
 94 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). Justice Scalia wrote a spirited defense of the Rehnquist 
opinion in Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1978). 
 95 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 85 n.299). 
 96 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 285 (2011) (codified as 
amended at various sections of 35 U.S.C.).  
 97 Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The modern system of patent examination should similarly 
escape challenges on nondelegation grounds notwithstanding the 
enormous increase in the number and complexity of patent 
applications. But that same judgment cannot be made about the 
modifications in patenting procedure inside the revised Patent 
and Trademark Office in connection with the Patent Trial and 
Appeals Board (PTAB) that was established under the 2011 
America Invents Act.98 The first of these difficulties relates to the 
breakdown in the doctrine of separation powers that arises when 
a party charged with patent infringement in federal district court 
is allowed, with the consent of the PTAB, to transfer that case to 
the board for review on key issues of patent validity. There is no 
reason why this departure from well-established nineteenth 
century practice should be tolerated, as the Supreme Court 
unfortunately did in Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s 
Energy Group, LLC.99 Notwithstanding this erroneous decision, 
the nondelegation doctrine does raise deep concerns with the 
procedures that were developed inside the PTAB to deal with the 
administrative rehearing, most notably in the decision to allow 
the head judge of the PTAB to select on an ad hoc basis the 
members of the panel, based on the likelihood that they would 
decide a case consistent with the PTAB judge’s view of 
department policy, and to add additional members to the panel 
(including himself) to change the outcome if the projected results 
are not to his liking.100 At this point, the case for the 
nondelegation doctrine merges with a fundamental concern about 
due process, as noted earlier, and the entire structure should be 
struck down because the risk of deviation from Congressional 
policy by these ad hoc adjustments is too great when no added 
informational advantage comes from delegating this 
extraordinary power to the chief judge of any court.101 The 
 
 98 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 284–341 (2011). 
 99 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). The most powerful precedent against ousting the courts of 
jurisdiction is McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman. 169 U.S. 606 (1898). There 
the Court stated:  
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has 
received the signature of the secretary of the interior, countersigned by the 
commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the seal of the patent office, 
it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not 
subject to be revoked or canceled by the president, or any other officer of the 
government. 
Id. at 608–09 (citations omitted). 
 100 For my critiques, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent 
Reform: A Series of Articles Examining Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s 
Energy Group, LLC, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 172, 180, 188 (2018). 
 101 The concern was raised, but not resolved, in Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan 
Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Dyk, J., concurring).  
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standard practice in these situations is to select judges by a 
system of rotation to control the risk of downstream abuse,102 and 
that practice should be followed in cases of this sort. There is 
nothing about the changes in technology or legal standards that 
requires a different result.  
C. Post Roads Debate 
The nondelegation doctrine also lies at the center of the 
Second Congress, with the Post Roads Debate of 1791 in the 
House of Representatives.103 The Constitution lists among the 
enumerated powers given to Congress under Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 7, the power “[t]o establish Post Offices and post 
Roads.”104 One measure of the importance of this power was that 
the Post Office received cabinet status in 1792, when it joined the 
four initial departments (State, Treasury, War, and Justice) of 
George Washington’s first cabinet.105 But the question then 
arises whether any of this function could be delegated by 
Congress to the President and his officers, including the 
Postmaster General. The same answer does not necessarily apply 
to post roads and to post offices, because the former involves the 
creation of a network industry, in which the location of post roads 
across the various cities and states could determine the overall 
efficiency of the system. In contrast, the location of a post office 
within a given city would mainly be of concern to the local 
residents of that community. The Congress had before it a map 
that indicated the location of the proposed post roads, when 
Representative Sedgwick proposed that the entire road network 
be scrapped and the matter be turned over to the President 
under a delegation of executive authority to the effect that roads 
would be laid down “by such route as the President of the United 
States shall, from time to time, cause to be established.”106 
 
[A]fter a three-member panel of administrative judges denied petitioner Broad 
Ocean’s request for joinder, Broad Ocean requested rehearing and requested 
that the rehearing be decided by an expanded panel. Subsequently, ‘[t]he 
Acting Chief Judge, acting on behalf of the Director,’ expanded the panel from 
three to five members, and the reconstituted panel set aside the earlier 
decision. 
Id. 
 102 See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2017). 
 103 Nat’l Archives, Post Office and Post Roads, [7 December] 1791, FOUNDERS ONLINE (Dec. 7, 
1971), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0126 [http://perma.cc/TEX6-3CY6]. 
 104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 105 Postal Service Act Regulates United States Post Office Department, HIST.  
(Feb. 18, 2021), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/postal-service-act-regulates-
united-states-post-office-department [http://perma.cc/SE48-CYGA]. 
 106 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791). See Wurman, supra note 23 (manuscript at 14–20) 
(critiquing Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 97–106)) for exhaustive 
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It is clear from the overall debates that some form of a 
nondelegation doctrine was recognized, even if its contours were not 
fully described. Had Sedgwick’s resolution passed, the case for a 
strong nondelegation doctrine would have been much diminished, 
but since his motion was defeated, it remains uncertain whether the 
outcome turned on constitutional principles or simply on an issue of 
prudence—namely, since the map had already been laid out, why 
delegate the matter any further?  
In dealing with this issue, that question is urgent because of 
the delegation’s evident lack of any direction as to which towns 
should be included along the route of the established post roads 
and which should be excluded. That point let Representative 
Page in the 1791 debate offer this instructive reductio ad 
absurdum: 
If the motion before the committee succeeds, I shall make one which 
will save a deal of time and money, by making a short session of it; for 
if this House can, with propriety, leave the business of the post office 
to the President, it may leave to him any other business of legislation; 
and I may move to adjourn and leave all the objects of legislation to 
his sole consideration and direction . . . . I look upon the motion as 
unconstitutional, and if it were not so, as having a mischievous 
tendency . . . .107 
Note the equivocation in the last phrase, precisely because 
the proposed motion did not go the extreme, but took a weaker 
position. His remarks, as emblematic of the general debate, 
however, beg for an explanation as to why everyone agrees with 
the unconstitutionality of the extreme position, even if it is not 
clear how far they are prepared to back off from it. The most 
powerful reason for condemning the outright transfer of power 
points to the following vice, namely, that the President could 
easily choose routes that excluded certain cities that Congress 
would have included. But that point need not be dispositive, for 
the President through delegation could have superior knowledge 
as to how all the pieces of the puzzle fit together and thus at a 
larger level establish a set of post roads that would conform to a 
general desire to stitch the nation together through a single 
system. And in any event, even Page would have to concede that 
any contracting done in making existing roads suitable as post 
roads would have to be left to the President as beyond the 
effective power of Congress. 
 
discussions on a nondelegation doctrine at the Founding. Section 1 of the Act set out the 
routes in one paragraph. See Post Office Act of 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232. The list of 
towns covered from Maine to Georgia is set out in Wurman, supra note 23 (manuscript at 
14 n.76). 
 107 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 233–34 (1791).  
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 9:19 AM 
2021] Delegation of Powers: A Historical and Functional Analysis 687 
In this case, everything is in equipoise. The Congress might 
have a better sense of its own preferences, but the President might 
not have any obvious agenda to deviate from the ideal solution. It is 
a close call either way, which is why the nondelegation dispute was 
not fully resolved. Indeed, it is evident from the specific provisions 
of the Post Office Act of 1792 that the mixed solution was preferred. 
The Act ran for thirty sections, in which it set out an elaborate 
administrative structure that at points eschewed delegation, but at 
other points embraced it.108 Thus Section 1 of the Act contained a 
detailed account of all the post roads that should be established 
from Maine to Georgia.109 But as comprehensive as that list was, it 
was not fully exhaustive, given Section 2, which states “[t]hat it 
shall and may be lawful for the Postmaster General to enter into 
contracts, for a term not exceeding eight years, for extending the 
line of posts . . . .”110 On the issue of rates there is a similar level of 
exactitude in Sections 9 and 10, which set out with great 
particularity basic postage rates for delivery by land and sea.111 Yet 
at the same time, Section 3 contains this broad delegation: “He shall 
also have power to prescribe such regulations to the deputy 
postmasters, and others employed under him, as may be found 
necessary, and to superintend the business of the 
department . . . .”112 It would therefore be absurd to read this 
statute as if it were intended to preclude any level of departmental 
delegation. But by the same token, the level of specificity in portions 
of the statute show some concern with the delegation doctrine. No 
matter which way this evidence is interpreted, it would be hasty to 
conclude that any broader delegation of powers would have passed 
muster as a matter of course.  
Yet there is enough in this Act to give some insight into 
subsequent developments, for with the advantage of hindsight, it 
should be clear that the results reached in 1792 were very 
dependent on scale.113 The knowledge advantage of the executive 
branch dominates today given the increase in scale; it is no longer 
 
  108 Post Office Act of 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232. 
 109 Post Office Act § 1. 
 110 Id. § 2, at 233. 
 111 See id. § 9, at 235, § 10, at 235. 
 112 Id. § 3, at 234. 
 113 The issue also arises in connection with impeachment. With a small Senate and 
large House, a trial by the full Senate makes sense, especially when the official 
impeached is the President. But with lower-level officials, it is highly costly, and hence 
rules that delegated the matter to a Senate panel, subject to oversight, passed muster. See 
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). For context, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 
(providing that the “Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,” which 
leaves it open whether the Senate as a whole has to sit). In Nixon, a divided court held up 
a system where the case was delegated in the first instance to a committee, with review 
by the entire Senate. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 224. 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 9:19 AM 
688 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:3 
possible to run a single post road from Maine to Georgia—you need 
an elaborate lattice. Hence the case for delegation becomes 
overwhelming, but at the same time the risk of political favoritism 
is larger. At this point, more extensive delegation is necessarily 
accepted, but at the same time, in line with the general theory of 
agency costs, we should expect Congress to establish other 
procedures for oversight and audit that are intended to rein in 
abuse, which always arises in these settings. Such procedures do 
not make an appearance in the 1792 Act. Hence the newer 
arrangement should also pass muster because Congress itself could 
have no collective judgment as to the ideal route structure.  
D. Delegation of Tariff Determinations  
Among the central sources of revenue in the United States 
during the nineteenth century were tariffs and custom duties, 
which were explicitly authorized under Article I, Section 8, Clause l, 
which gave Congress the power to “lay and collect . . . Duties, 
Imposts and Excises,” so long as these were uniform throughout the 
United States.114 This protectionist system is not consistent with 
the classical liberal ideal of free trade, but its explicit textual 
authorization means that the only serious question is how to 
administer it, given that tariff determinations and adjustments 
have to be made for literally thousands of products that are often 
difficult to define, let alone classify.115 There is clearly the most 
practical justification for the delegation of this power first by 
Congress to the President and through him to lesser officials 
charged with the determination of particular rates for particular 
classes of goods. This issue arose in the important case of J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,116 which dealt with a statute 
requiring administrators to make tariff adjustments within 
relatively limited boundaries. In Hampton, the administrator had 
the power to impose tariffs on foreign goods such that “the duties 
not only secure revenue, but at the same time enable domestic 
producers to compete on terms of equality with foreign producers in 
the markets of the United States.”117 The statute followed a mixed 
strategy because the basic delegation in question had to fall 
 
 114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 115 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (applying Skidmore deference to tariff classification of the United States 
Customs Service). 
 116 276 U.S. 394 (1928). See also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 
(1892) (“That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a principle 
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of 
government ordained by the constitution.”). For further explication, see DUBIOUS 
MORALITY, supra note 6, at 48. 
 117 276 U.S. at 404.  
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between four and six cents per unit and was subject to approval or 
disapproval by the President. Here is a case in which Congress has 
only a limited ability to engage in fine tuning of Madison’s “details” 
that this statute appears to embody, and the technical adjustments 
in this case appear to be subject to a formula that further limits the 
scope of administration discretion. Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft upheld this delegation of power, to an Article I court no less, 
saying: “It may be that it is difficult to fix with exactness this 
difference, but the difference which is sought in the statute is 
perfectly clear and perfectly intelligible.”118 
That is just as it should be, given that there is a formula that 
can be used to determine the tariff within those limits. The 
principle here is indeed similar to that found in Roman law, where 
the requirement that the price be “certain” for the transaction to go 
forward did not require that the price be given in numerical form.119 
It was enough if a formula was supplied that allowed the price to be 
calculated once certain measurable variables were entered, such as 
the age and source of the wine. Just that mechanism is used today 
to allow people to calculate the sales price on certain items in 
uncertain market conditions. There is no sensible theory that says 
that a delegation of this sort should be rejected: all the expertise is 
downstream, and there is little risk of deviation from the main plan, 
especially when a judicial challenge is available in egregious cases 
under the principle of judicial review. The challenge that remains is 
what happens in the modern industrial age, which imposes far 
greater demands on the regulatory state. 
E. Delegation in the Modern Industrial Age 
The challenges to the nondelegation principle become much 
more difficult to assess in the modern industrial age now that the 
tasks of government are far larger. The initial impulse on these 
issues comes first with the rate regulation cases that began to hit 
the courts in the post-civil war period.120 With the rise of the 
railroads, it quickly became clear that competitive solutions were 
not always, even often, obtainable by market processes.121 The 
root of the problem was the long-haul, short-haul inversion that 
arose because of the organization of the routes.122 The most 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 See DIG 18.7.1 (Ulpian, Sabinus 28). 
 120 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 121 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994). 
 122 Long Haul-Short Haul Rate Discrimination, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Mar. 8, 2021), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/long-
haul-short-haul-rate-discrimination [http://perma.cc/8FRM-X4AD].  
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famous example is that there are four different railroads that 
could shift and move freight and passengers from San Francisco 
to Chicago, but only one such railroad that could move traffic 
from Omaha to Kansas City. Given the multiple avenues on the 
long-haul lines, the prices tended to be bid down toward marginal 
cost. But given the inelastic supply on the short haul, the 
railroads could raise rates far above marginal costs, and these 
rates were still (as by definition) below what these shippers were 
prepared to pay for access to the system. It was therefore 
perfectly efficient to have these inversions, but it was also 
politically impossible to justify them. Hence the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887123 (a huge deal at the time) adopted, as its 
core administrative standard, a principle that left little to the 
imagination, namely that the short-haul rates could not be 
higher than the long-haul rates of which they were a part.124 
That strategy forced rates up on the long haul to control the risk 
of rate inversions. Subsequent iterations of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, however, adopted direct ratemaking standards 
intended to keep rates of return at competitive levels.125 Indeed 
that practice gave rise to a famous ratemaking difficulty that 
started with the Minnesota Rate cases,126 in which the Supreme 
Court held that the desire (here expressed at the state level) to 
prevent the imposition of monopoly rates had to be policed in 
order to guard the railroads, and later other public utilities, from 
the risk of confiscation.127 These issues arose under both state 
and federal law, and the former was not constrained by the 
nondelegation argument applicable to the federal Constitution 
any more than it was constrained to avoid delegation to various 
sorts of administrative agencies. Instead, state administrative 
law could impose limitations that could vary from state to 
 
 123 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 
various sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 124 See also id. at 380 (“That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to 
the provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate 
for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of property, under substantially 
similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the 
same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance . . . 
.”). The statute allowed for exceptions to the basic rule in “special cases,” which obviously 
makes the delegation more questionable. One way in which this flexibility was recognized 
was in cases of competition on the short-haul route. See Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Ala. 
Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 165 (1897). 
 125 See, e.g., Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906); see also Mann-Elkins Act of 
1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. 
 126 Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n, 
134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
 127 The theme was further developed in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 470 (1898). See 
also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944). 
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state.128 Given the nature of the problem, some degree of 
delegation had to be tolerated. No one thought that the Congress 
could set out a precise formula to deal with these complex 
ratemaking issues. Overall, the federal constitutional law that 
developed to deal with these problems had sufficient integrity 
that the modern condemnation about the runaway 
administrative state did not have much traction in that period. 
The same cannot be said, however, of the far more ambitious 
problems under the New Deal which, if anything, were the 
obverse of those of the earlier rate making cases. Thus, whether 
one speaks of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,129 the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935,130 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938,131 the Communications Act of 1934132—but not the 
Securities Act of 1933,133 nor the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,134 which were primarily antifraud acts—a different 
problem was faced. With this vast expansion of federal power, it 
was now necessary for administrative bodies, such as the 
National Labor Relations Board, to undertake such tasks as 
determining the proper bargaining unit of union elections and 
the proper definition of an hour for minimum wage and overtime 
regulation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Similarly, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission had to determine the kinds of 
freight that different forms of vehicles could take over interstate 
highways.135 
This spate of new powers drove two additional challenges 
under the nondelegation doctrine, most notably in A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States.136 There, the Schechters were 
indicted for acts that were said to be in violation of the Code of Fair 
Competition for the Live Poultry Industry in the New York 
Metropolitan area,137 which was promulgated under Section 3 of the 
 
 128 For an exhaustive compilation of state law reactions to the nondelegation doctrine, 
see Benjamin Silver, Nondelegation in the States, (Dec. 31, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  
 129 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.  
 130 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169). 
 131 Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 201). 
 132 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151). 
 133 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa). 
 134 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq). 
 135 See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 (codified as 
amended at various sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 136 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 137 See id. at 519. 
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National Industrial Recovery Act.138 One ground on which the 
Court rejected the Codes was the view that the Commerce Clause 
governed only the interstate legs of the journey between New Jersey 
and New York, and did not extend to ground transportation by 
separate vehicle in New York state alone.139 That argument did not 
have a long shelf life and was overturned two years later in 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.140 
The fate of the nondelegation doctrine is more complex. In 
Schechter Poultry, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes noted 
that the Codes did not use “[u]nfair competition” in its common 
law sense, which embraced two distinct and well-recognized 
torts: passing off one’s own goods as if they were made by 
another (superior) competitor, and falsely disparaging the goods 
of a competitor to make one’s own goods look better.141 The 
reason that banning these actions would have met any standard 
of nondelegation is that they relied explicitly on well-established 
common law causes of action. But the new use of the term unfair 
competition bore no relationship to its common law cousin, 
because Congress deemed the common law definition “too 
narrow” for its purposes.142 So at this point, a statement of what 
a term did not mean was not an articulation of what it did mean, 
and Justice Hughes took the position that no court should be put, 
in the course of resolving future cases, in the position of rescuing 
a statute that did not provide a workable definition of what 
conduct it covered. One of the key features of any criminal 
statute is that it gives fair notice of the covered offenses. So, the 
sword quickly struck:  
Section 3 of the Recovery Act . . . is without precedent. It supplies no 
standards for any trade, industry, or activity. It does not undertake to 
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact 
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of 
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to 
prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, section 3 sets up no 
standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of 
rehabilitation, correction, and expansion described in section 1.143 
Exactly what is wrong with that delegation? First, the 
analysis did not change because the President had “approved the 
 
 138 See id. at 521; see also National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3(a), 
48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933) (authorizing the President to “approve a code or codes of fair 
competition”). 
 139 See 295 U.S. at 543. 
 140 See 301 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1937). 
 141 See 295 U.S. at 531–32. 
 142 See id. at 532. 
 143 Id. at 541. 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 9:19 AM 
2021] Delegation of Powers: A Historical and Functional Analysis 693 
code by an executive order.”144 Instead, what drove the analysis 
was the scope of the delegation on matters including wage and 
hour laws—whose constitutionality at that time was not yet 
established—as well as various rules governing the slaughter 
and preparation of the animals for market, and the provision as 
to the kind of animals (including “sick chickens”) that could be 
sold in commerce. And in this case, Justice Cardozo described the 
actions as “delegation running riot” and, echoing Locke, noted 
that “[n]o such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer.”145 
The point here should be taken literally: it is highly likely that 
the strong pro-New Deal Congress was delighted with the flurry 
of presidential activity because of its welcome extension of 
progressive principles beyond the hoary conceptions of the 
common law, which at least at that time held some doubt. The 
correct point here is not to mock the decision as a lone outcast in 
a long history of cases. Rather, it is to make the candid judgment 
that Justice Hughes was right in finding that this was an 
unsustainable delegation of power that should not survive. 
Indeed, in one sense, this kind of broad delegation surely did 
survive: the delegation issue arose in oblique fashion the next 
year in the well-vetted case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.146 In May 1934, both Houses of Congress passed a 
joint resolution that, in explicit terms, strongly empowered the 
President. The resolution stated that if he thought that a 
prohibition of a sale of arms to parties involved in the armed 
conflict in Chaco (a border war between Bolivia and Paraguay) 
would reestablish peace, he could impose by proclamation a 
prohibition on the sale of arms to the warring parties.147 As by 
evident prearrangement, that same day President Roosevelt 
issued a proclamation to that effect,148 which he then revoked in 
November 1935.149 In the interim, defendant Curtiss-Wright 
violated the prohibition, for which a criminal prosecution 
followed, but only after Roosevelt’s revocation of the 
proclamation.150 The resolution was not legislation, and the 
proclamation was not the signing of a bill into law. 
Curtiss-Wright defended on the ground that the particular 
resolution created an improper delegation of power to the President 
 
  144 Id. at 525. 
 145 Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).  
 146 See 299 U.S. 304, 314 (1936). 
 147 See id. at 311–12. 
  148 See id. at 311.  
 149 See id. at 313. 
  150 See id. at 314. 
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because it conferred “unfettered discretion”151 in violation of the 
nondelegation doctrine, whose existence was taken for granted in 
the opinion. But Justice Sutherland responded: “Whether, if the 
Joint Resolution had related solely to internal affairs, it would be 
open to the challenge that it constituted an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power to the Executive, we find it unnecessary to 
determine.”152 Note that this resolution was not legislation, but a 
directive to the President on how he might proceed if he chose to 
proceed. The President’s response was not a signing of a bill, but the 
issuance of a proclamation—leaving open the question of whether 
the President, in his extensive (if undefined) control over foreign 
affairs, needed to have the backing of a congressional resolution in 
the first place, or whether he could have engaged in that action on 
the strength of his own powers alone.153 Sutherland chose the 
second route, by announcing that the President was this nation’s 
“sole organ” in international relations.154 The joint resolution was 
thus superfluous, and the application of the nondelegation doctrine 
necessarily disappeared. 
But how? Justice Sutherland’s main point was that foreign 
affairs are governed by entirely different principles than 
domestic affairs because the President’s powers over foreign 
affairs did not come from Congress, but were obtained in an 
entirely different fashion: “As a result of the separation from 
Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of 
external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies 
severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate 
capacity as the United States of America.”155 How that happened 
was never explained, and if anything, Federalist Paper No. 69 
takes the position that the President as Commander-in-Chief of 
the army and navy has far more limited powers than either the 
English Crown or a state governor.156 The absolutist position of 
 
 151 See id. at 315. 
 152 Id. 
  153 See id. at 319–20. 
 154 See id.  
 155 Id. at 316. 
 156 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2011) 
The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United 
States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of 
the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount 
to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and 
naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy: while that of the 
British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating 
of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would 
appertain to the legislature.  
Hamilton later claims that in some instances the President is inferior in power to state 
governors. See id. at 360.  
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Curtiss-Wright is an evident source of uneasiness, and the 
decision was cut back to an uncertain extent in the 2015 decision 
of Zivotofsky v. Kerry,157 in which Justice Kennedy issued an ipse 
dixit that backtracked from the President’s claim of exclusive 
authority: “This Court declines to acknowledge that unbounded 
power.”158  
Yet, now suppose that the delegation issue arose in a 
domestic context where (by hypothesis) some legislative act was 
necessary for its exercise. Could the President decide, for 
example, to intervene in a violent labor dispute by prohibiting 
the sale of guns, if he thought that conditions warranted it? It is 
a very close case indeed, and typically it is not one that would 
arise, in part because state officials have a general charge to 
keep order and would take over the situation. Or in most cases, 
legislation that contains far more particularity—allowing the 
protection of federal buildings against violence—would take over. 
This point is explored later, in a discussion of the Steel Seizure 
case which held that the President had exceeded his power.159 
The delegation issue, however, arose again in National 
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,160 where the Supreme Court 
was asked to construe the phrase “public interest, convenience, 
or necessity” as it appeared in the Communications Act of 
1934.161 At this point, the difference between Schechter Poultry in 
1935 and National Broadcasting Co. in 1943 is that the common 
law benchmarks on which Justice Hughes and Justice Cardozo 
had relied were nowhere to be found. Now a broad reading of the 
statute was par for the course precisely because of the demotion 
of common law notions. Of course, it was still possible to read the 
1934 Act as if it required that the government organize a bidding 
system whereby various firms could compete for various parts of 
the spectrum in auctions organized by the United States.162 At 
this point, it would be required to set up standards for 
interference between neighboring frequencies (a problem that 
gets less serious as transmission improves), and to create rules 
for bidding, a task that is better done by an agency than by 
Congress. The agency has more knowledge with little incentive or 
ability to skew the bidding or interference rules in favor of one 
party. Here, a system of ex post challenges on grounds of bias is 
 
 157 576 U.S. 1 (2015). 
 158 Id. at 20. 
 159 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952). 
 160 319 U.S. 190, 209 (1943). 
 161 See id. at 214–18.  
 162 For this suggestion, see R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 17–24 (1959). 
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likely to work far more efficiently than an effort to invite judicial 
review before the rules are allowed to go into effect. 
The difficulty here was that Justice Frankfurter, the 
indefatigable progressive, could not stop with such modest 
ambitions. A year before Friedrich Hayek published The Road to 
Serfdom—which defended the view parallel to that taken in this 
Article, that it is dangerous to do too much with administrative 
control163—Justice Frankfurter, suffering no doubts, wrote:  
The Act itself establishes that the Commission’s powers are not 
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio 
communication. Yet we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind 
of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from 
interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the 
Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the 
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic. 
The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who 
wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among 
the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it 
committed the task to the Commission.164 
Justice Frankfurter committed the basic economic blunder of 
assuming that shortages could not be resolved by competitive 
bids, indicating that comparative hearings should be used to 
resolve the competing applications in line with the basic 
scheme.165 But in this instance, how does any conscientious 
agency best determine the composition of the traffic? The FCC 
dithered over the issue until 1965, when it tried to plug the holes 
in the record by giving, without weights, the full seven relevant 
issues for deciding these hearings: (1) diversification of control of 
the media of mass communications, (2) full-time participation in 
station operation by owners, (3) proposed program service, (4) 
past broadcast record, (5) efficient use of frequency, (6) character, 
and (7) other factors.166 
It should be evident that the level of discretion given here is 
as great as the unconditional defenders of delegation think, and 
it is equally clear that the standard here does not have the 
perfectly intelligible features of the tariff determinations done in 
Hampton.167 Here, there is little guidance from the statute and 
immense discretion over the entire process, which should doom 
 
 163 See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 1 (1944). 
 164 Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 215–16.  
 165 See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 337–38 (1945). 
 166 For the historical development, see KPMG LLP, Final Report: History of the 
Broadcast License Application Process, FCC 4–5 (Nov. 2000), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb_study/broadcast_lic_study_pt1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7AKC-DMJ5]. 
 167 See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405–09 (1928).  
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this statute on the nondelegation doctrine because the 
nonmarket system of allocation does not and could not work. But 
once the progressive mindset takes over, the statute is 
unquestionably constitutional, which means that the vague 
standard is as good as can be found given the statutory ambition, 
should be treated as a feature, not a bug of the system. Hence 
any aggressive application of the nondelegation doctrine becomes 
a thing of the past. The basic plan of this statute is to encourage 
indeterminate property rights, at which point, the delegation 
doctrine has to expand in scope to be sufficient to handle the 
situation in which constitutionality was beyond dispute. Put 
otherwise, there are no principled limits on delegation to 
administrative agencies when the property rights model of 
business organization is rejected. The invocation of the 
nondelegation doctrine should not be used as a backdoor device to 
undermine the substantive determination on the merits of the 
statute, no matter how unsound that constitutional 
determination might be. As the substantive law expands, the 
nondelegation doctrine of necessity recedes. 
Jumping ahead, the next quantum leap in delegation arises 
in Mistretta v. United States, which addresses delegation in the 
criminal context.168 Here, the progressive mindset has proved to 
be much more concerned with the traditional procedural 
protections. Therefore, modern cases dealing with the assistance 
of counsel, self-incrimination, cross-examination, and searches 
and seizures are not examined under rational basis. Rather, they 
often deal with quite specific protections, such as the Miranda 
rules for the investigation of criminal subjects.169 But as a 
general matter, both in civil and in criminal cases, it is easier to 
define the violation than it is to specify the sanction for its 
occurrence, especially when modern notions of exculpation 
broaden the relevant inquiry. Phrases like “in the sound 
discretion of the trial judge” are rife, and they persist because 
whether the issue is damages or injunctions, fines or 
imprisonment, the choices are far from ideal. In the criminal law, 
it is easy to see how the exercise of discretion need not only be 
unsound, but it can also be inconsistent across cases. This piles 
concerns of equal treatment on top of substantive fairness, which 
leads to strong pressures to institute a sentencing commission of 
sorts to improve both matters. The ground rules of that 
sentencing commission are complex themselves, and rules that 
 
 168 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989). 
 169 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). 
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they generate often introduce new anomalies to replace the old.170 
A divided Supreme Court sustained this exercise against an 
application of the nondelegation doctrine, invoking the 
intelligible principle test of Hampton to address these 
difficulties.171 Mortenson and Bagley applauded the decision, 
writing, “By the founders’ lights, Mistretta v. United States was 
thus rightly decided: even if ‘rulemaking power originates in the 
Legislative Branch,’ it ‘becomes an executive function’ at the 
moment it is ‘delegated by the Legislature to the Executive 
Branch.’”172 Current delegation is strikingly different from any 
form of delegation found in the early cases, which deal with 
revolutionary war pensions, patents or post roads, all of which 
were bounded inquiries conducted toward satisfying a stated 
statutory end.173 The guidelines did—and did not—work, but 
United States v. Booker pulled back from Mistretta explicitly to 
remove the constitutional doubts that excessive delegation gives 
to mandatory rules, so much so that I regard Booker as 
qualifying Mistretta, presumably on nondelegation grounds.174 
The solution seems sensible, for it gives some assistance over 
uniformity and fairness even at the cost of letting the occasional 
fringe judge systematically go outside guidelines. Once again, 
some tradeoffs are needed.  
F. Gatekeeper function: Gundy After Auer 
Even after the massive expansion of delegated authority to 
accommodate vague New Deal directives, do any limitations on 
delegated powers survive decisions like National Broadcasting Co. 
v. United States? The answer is yes, for many key issues of 
delegation do not involve trade-offs among intangibles that require 
administrative actions. In particular, there are still key “gateway” 
provisions that only ask the simple question of whether certain 
 
 170 Here are the ground rules: The Commission “is established as an independent 
commission in the judicial branch of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). It has seven 
voting members (one of whom is the Chairman) appointed by the President "by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. "At least 3 of the members shall be Federal 
judges selected after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States." Id. “Not more than four members of the 
Commission shall be members of the same political party . . . .” Id. The Attorney General, 
or his designee, is an ex officio nonvoting member. Id. The Chairman and other members 
of the Commission are subject to removal by the President "only for neglect of duty or 
malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." Id. Except for initial staggering of 
terms, a voting member serves for six years and may not serve more than two full terms. 
28 U.S.C. § 992(a)–(b). 
 171 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 172 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 56) (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 
386 n.14).  
 173 See id. 
 174 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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types of individuals or projects fall within the scope of the statute. 
This very issue arose recently in the much-mooted decision of 
Gundy v. United States,175 where the question was whether under 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),176 
Congress could confer authority on the Attorney General to decide 
whether SORNA’s registration requirements applied to sex 
offenders who committed their offenses prior to the passage of the 
statute. SORNA also delegated to the Attorney General the ability 
to prescribe rules for sex offender registration. This raised a 
distinct problem given that the government would be required to 
devise ways to notify individuals—many whom had been outside 
the prison system for years—that they were subject to a new 
registration requirement that carried with it criminal penalties. 
It should be evident that there is a sharp distinction 
between the two delegated tasks. The second—giving notice to 
past offenders and requiring their registration—looks just like 
filling in the details of a scheme. But the same cannot be said 
of the first decision dealing with the proposed retroactivity of 
the criminal law. That decision raises not only the added 
administrative burden, but questions of whether to override a 
presumption against retroactive legislation given that these 
past offenders may still be recidivists. Thinking through the 
moral, practical, and constitutional dimensions on 
retroactivity is cut from a different cloth from devising notice 
provisions. Any legislature would be well advised to study 
these issues in detail. The question then is whether that 
ultimate decision could be delegated to the Attorney General, 
especially when he need not (and in fact did not) make any 
study of any sort. In principle, the right answer is clear 
enough: if the Congress cannot decide whether or not SORNA 
should be made retroactive, then they should not pass any 
provision dealing with the question. They cannot punt it over 
to the Attorney General any more than they could let him 
decide, for example, whether the statute should apply to both 
women and men offenders. 
Justice Kagan did not address this simple solution. Instead, 
she sustained the delegation by reaching the dramatic conclusion 
that the operation of the entire administrative state was at risk if 
this statute were struck down on nondelegation grounds: 
Indeed, if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of 
Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the 
 
 175 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).  
 176 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 
§§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20962).  
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need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its 
programs. Consider again this Court’s long-time recognition: 
“Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad general directives.”177 
Yet the differences between the simple up-down decision in 
Gundy and the dubious stretch of administrative power in 
Mistretta should require no explanation. As noted earlier, 
Mistretta was qualified and may, in some interpretations, have 
been overturned in Booker, but even if it was not, it is worlds 
apart from Gundy, which could be reversed without bringing the 
administrative state to a halt. Yet unfortunately, Justice Kagan 
never explored a narrower argument that would allow the 
Attorney General to set the registration requirement, without 
also being allowed to answer the gatekeeper question of whether 
the statute should extend to prior offenders. Indeed, Gundy 
comes very close to Locke’s extreme hypothetical of the outright 
delegation of the entire legislative power to an official inside the 
executive branch.178 After all, by that logic, the government could 
apply SORNA to all persons whether or not they were in prison 
when the statute was enacted, resulting in the destruction of the 
structural separation between the legislative and executive 
branch. This is not a case where a functional analysis calls for 
delegation. There is no new downstream information that the 
Attorney General can gather that the legislature cannot. And 
there is a serious risk that the Attorney General’s decision could 
skew the outcome in a way that the majority did not approve. 
Hence a narrow nondelegation decision preserves the doctrine 
without calling into question any of the major delegation statutes 
of either the founding period or the progressive age. 
None of this logic was able to deter Mortenson and Bagley, 
who continue to insist that the line between legislation and the 
executive power cannot be drawn.179 But their account never 
explains what is left of the primary distinction between Article I 
and Article II of the Constitution. Rather, they consistently reject 
the account championed by Justice Gorsuch and others that 
legislation has “to mean the power to adopt generally applicable 
rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons.”180 
That account contains a serious weakness because in Gundy the 
proposition that SORNA applies to sexual offenders who were 
released from custody has the same generality whether 
propounded by statute or regulation. But to the requirement of 
 
 177 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372). 
 178 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 179 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 31). 
 180 Id. (citing Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133). 
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generality must be added the proposition that the Attorney 
General could not on his own motion require any sexual offenders 
to register with his office, even if he can fill in the details on how 
the registration system should work.  
This is not a novel position. Just this understanding of the 
limitations on presidential power was articulated in the Steel 
Seizure case, brought against Charles Sawyer, Truman’s 
Secretary of Commerce.181 Limitations on the executive are 
certainly embodied in the decisions of all the Justices who 
questioned the power of President Truman to seize on his own 
initiative the steel plants during the Korean War on the ground 
that it was necessary to keep production going in the face of a 
strike.182 Justice Frankfurter had taken the view that the Labor 
Management Act of 1947 had considered and rejected the idea of 
vesting the President with this power, and that such power could 
not be read into the President’s personal powers derived solely 
from holding the office.183 And Justice Jackson famously 
concluded that the President’s power was “at its lowest ebb” 
when it was against the will of the Congress.184 Yet the assorted 
statements from notable political theorists that Mortenson and 
Bagley cite include such heavyweights as Montesquieu185 and 
Rousseau186, and constitutional founders who do not address 
explicitly the architectural split between Article I and Article II. 
And even their citation to Locke ignores Paragraph 141, cited 
above in favor of relying on the anodyne Section 143, which talks 
about standing laws and arbitrary decrees, without addressing 
the separation of powers implicit in his discussion of the 
legislative power in Paragraph 141.187 Indeed, with all the 
 
 181 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–84 (1952). 
 182 Id. at 588–89. 
 183 Id. at 599 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
No room for doubt remains that the proponents as well as the opponents of the 
bill which became the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 clearly 
understood that as a result of that legislation the only recourse for preventing 
a shutdown in any basic industry, after failure of mediation, was Congress. 
Id. 
 184 Id. at 637 (Jackson J., concurring). Low ebb does not mean, however, that the 
President always loses. Indeed, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 14 (2015), the majority 
of the Court held that the President exercised the exclusive power to recognize foreign 
nations on an issue where there is a genuine constitutional gap, resting on a theory of 
consistent practice over the years. But note that recognition is not a legislative act. 
 185 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8 (manuscript at 32 n.106) (citing Montesquieu 
Book 11, Chapter 6) (“The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or 
permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject; one being no 
more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general 
will[.]”).  
 186 Id. (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762)). 
 187 Id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ¶ 143 (1689)). 
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huffing and puffing, these attacks miss the narrow ground by 
which Gundy can be attacked, namely that it seeks to delegate a 
simple dichotomous decision on statutory coverage that raises 
none of the tradeoffs required under other modern Progressive 
statutes such as the Federal Communications Act. Those 
delegations remain valid under the analysis made here, at least 
if these statutes remain constitutional, which in my view they 
should not. 
The fear with respect to excessive delegation expressed first 
by Mortenson and Bagley, and subsequently by Parrillo is all the 
more remarkable because neither of them—nor for that matter, 
Wurman—cite the one case that was correctly under siege in 
Gundy, namely the extravagant decision of Justice Scalia in Auer 
v. Robbins,188 which was spared constitutional oblivion by Justice 
Kagan’s ingenious reinterpretation in Kisor v. Willkie.189 In one 
sense, Auer is not a delegation decision at all, because the 
Congress did not ask the Secretary to decide whether to include 
“executive, administrative or professional employees” as 
protected workers, which would have been an impermissible 
delegation.190 It is even worse, because the Secretary of Labor 
unilaterally extended the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
in the teeth of statutory language that required the other 
result.191 That said, Auer and Kisor are constitutional opposites. 
The issue in Kisor was a narrow and technical question that 
dealt with the award of disability benefits for an ex-marine who 
suffered combat-related injuries. The particular statutory phrase 
at issue was whether there were “relevant official service 
department records” which should have been considered in his 
case for disability benefits.192 The key issue was defining 
“relevant.”193 At one level, the case is a pure question of statutory 
construction that the Court could decide on its own, given that 
the text of the Administrative Procedure Act requires these 
questions of statutory construction be decided de novo.194 After 
the legal determination, the VA, in the ordinary course of 
business, can make a factual determination of when the various 
 
 188 519 U.S. 452 (1997). For a more detailed discussion, see DUBIOUS MORALITY, 
supra note 6, at 134–35. 
 189 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).  
 190 Auer, 519 U.S. at 454, 461. 
 191 See id. at 461. 
 192 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 193 See id. 
 194 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an 
agency action.”). Contra Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (which never cites the operative text). 
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injuries arose. This last delegation is required by the general 
test: there is better downstream information that would be useful 
to handle individual cases, without any fear of systematic bias. 
But there is no reason to delegate down to the agency questions 
that are properly left to judicial interpretation. 
Nonetheless, Kisor served as a jumping-off point from which 
to examine the judicial deference afforded to federal agencies in 
interpreting the language of federal statutes in the context of the 
Department of Labor’s unilateral decision to expand the 
jurisdiction of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Auer involved the 
question of the proper scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
which provides first that the minimum wage and overtime 
provisions should apply to employees, subject to an exception that 
excludes “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” 
employees from the overtime provisions.195 
During the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Labor 
Robert Reich reclassified police sergeants and lieutenants as 
ordinary employees, equivalent to the patrolmen whom they were 
charged to supervise. Justice Scalia applied extreme deference to 
sustain this position that runs contrary to both the applicable 
statutory context and ordinary usage. The deference in this case 
extended coverage far beyond any sensible reading of the statute, 
allowing the Secretary to rope into the statute individuals who 
did not belong there. Justice Kagan (who also wrote in Gundy) 
knew that the Scalia opinion was highly vulnerable, so she 
overruled the case, de facto, by announcing that deference should 
only apply after every effort was made with traditional statutory 
tools to find the correct meaning of the phrase—at which point 
that outcome in Auer, as well as similar coverage cases, should be 
read as if it were a tantamount violation of the nondelegation 
doctrine. Justice Kagan wrote, “[f]irst and foremost, a court 
should not afford Auer deference unless the regulation is 
genuinely ambiguous,” and she added that “before concluding a 
rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the 
‘traditional tools’ of construction.”196 So once again, Auer, like 
Gundy, is indefensible (as a purported delegation) even in a 
regime that accepts the delegations found permissible in 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,197 and perhaps even 
Mistretta.  
There is a double irony here. The progressives strongly 
backed Auer and its progeny, but they are deeply opposed to 
 
 195 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 196 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 197 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
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Gundy.198 Indeed, Gundy was represented by the Stanford Law 
School Supreme Court Legal Clinic while the Trump 
Administration’s Deputy Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall defended 
SORNA.199 Nothing in the principle of separation of powers calls 
for any distinction between civil and criminal cases. But if there 
were any such distinction, then Gundy should be subject to 
greater scrutiny than Auer because the requirements of notice 
are always stronger in the criminal context. But the correct 
solution for progressives as well as classical liberals is the 
nondelegation principle, which blocks both Auer and Gundy. Both 
cases set policy on basic coverage while neither fills in the details 
(valuation and administration). The line at the founding is the 
same line today. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The basic rule against sub-delegation has its origins in private 
law, dating back to Roman times. Yet an absolute prohibition would 
make it impossible for people to form partnerships or other kinds of 
complex associations, all of which may require multiple levels of 
delegation. What is true of private firms is also true within the 
public sector. Congress itself receives delegated power from the 
people, but routinely makes further delegations down to particular 
agencies. There is no other organizational structure that could allow 
any set of general legislated principles to be applied to particular 
cases. In both these settings, therefore, the task is to find ways to 
allow for delegation, but to control for the potential of abuse, either 
by the party who makes the delegation or, what is relevant here, 
the party to whom that delegation is made. Controlling for abuse 
involves complex trade-offs in an effort to minimize the two types of 
error that always arise under conditions of uncertainty: blocking a 
delegation that should be permitted and permitting a delegation 
that should be blocked. There is no single simple strategy that deals 
with these problems, so every legal system must adopt mixed 
strategies that rely on some combination of ex ante and ex post 
sanctions.  
This essay has explored how these two sanctions mix, first by 
dealing with the private delegation issues, which in turn become 
a template by which to analyze the delegation problem under 
 
 198 Indeed, there was not a single amicus brief in support of the government, with both progressive 




54945fcadea&transitionType=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Default) [http://perma.cc/2TJ6-6VJK].  
 199 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2118. 
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American constitutional law. The basic model asks two questions. 
First, can the delegatee take advantage of knowledge about a 
particular case that is not available to the principal? Where it is 
true, the delegation should be encouraged. Second, is there a 
danger that the delegatee will adopt a substantive position at 
odds with the general program set out by the principal? The 
principal could be a board of directors of a corporation or 
association, or the United States Congress. 
In general, the presumption should be set in favor of allowing 
delegation to proceed, but subject to this critical caveat: in an 
individual case, the government’s decision could be challenged after 
the fact, on the grounds that it exceeds the proper scope of 
delegation. But in an important class of cases, the ex-ante 
prohibition of delegation should be implemented. These include 
cases where the delegated party seeks to expand (or contract) its 
jurisdiction in ways that are inconsistent with the terms of the 
original grant, or allow them to make critical decision that the 
principal could have made with equal dispatch. 
In general, relatively few challenges should succeed on these 
grounds. That result holds not because there are no principled 
limitations on the delegated powers of the agent, but, rather, 
because these limitations are routinely observed. That basic insight 
informs the analysis of key legislative actions during the Founding 
period, where delegation to executive branch officials was commonly 
and correctly used in cases involving patents, pensions, post offices, 
land recordations, and taxes that required the application of general 
principles to particular cases. But it is one thing to show that these 
delegated actions took place, and quite another to show that they 
exceeded appropriate limitations, usually by consciously defying the 
norms set out in the basic legislation. 
Accordingly, the formulation offered, most notably by Chief 
Justice Marshall, in Wayman v. Southard200 is that the legislature 
sets the basic parameters while the executive or administrator fill in 
the details. This is not an empty proposition that allows any and all 
tasks to be shifted back and forth between legislative and executive 
officials either “easily” or “readily” as Mortenson and Bagley claim. 
Rather, in all cases it takes legislation to get the process going, and 
requires the executives to follow the basic prescription, without 
adding or eliminating any of its requirements. 
That basic prohibition works as well in modern times as it 
did in the Founding period. What differs between the pre- and 
post-New Deal constitutions is the specificity of the terms of the 
 
 200 23 U.S. 1 (1825). 
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mandates that are allowed. In the earlier period where the tasks 
of government were more clearly confined to land grants, 
patents, post offices, tariffs and the like, these delegations were 
quite limited so that the basic nondelegation principle was rarely 
tested. But moving onto the Progressive Era, the aims of 
government expanded for two reasons: first the scope of federal 
power under the Commerce Clause expanded, and second the 
limitations on government power, at both the federal and state 
level, to regulate economic liberties or private property were 
largely erased. Together these developments gave space for major 
government initiatives that require the operation of the 
administrative state. Hence, either executive branch officials or 
independent agencies had to bear an ever-larger fraction of the 
work under broad, but necessarily vague, formulas such as 
“public interest, convenience, or necessity.”201 The only way those 
delegations could be attacked is to strike down the basic scheme 
on constitutional grounds, which was far more common when the 
Commerce Clause was narrowly read and economic liberties and 
private property enjoyed greater protection. Those days are gone, 
and with their passing the set of delegations necessarily had to 
increase. It would, moreover, in my view be grossly improper to 
try to use the back-door tactic of the nondelegation doctrine to 
undermine the New Deal synthesis on both federal power and 
individual rights. Those doctrines should be overruled (as I have 
long urged) explicitly, or kept. And the scope of the delegation 
doctrine should be determined by the chosen set of constitutional 
principles, not otherwise. But even when these constitutional 
changes are given full rein, there still comes a point at which the 
legislature sets the mission, and the executive fills in the details. 
The misguided operations of the FCC may still be protected, but 
by the same token the sprawling delegations of Mistretta can be 
blocked and the bald delegation in Gundy can be undone. As such 
the nondelegation doctrine survives, but in the end of the day, it 
does not flourish as a dominant constraint on governmental 
power. 
 
 201 Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 215. 
